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accept the offer made by the dissenters, or to take one of the
alternative actions" offered by the statute. When they failed to
pursue any of these courses the corporation became obligated to
pay the price asked by the dissenters. The corporation, and not
the shareholders, was deprived of property by the action, or
rather inaction, of its duly authorized agents. As has been pointed
out by Professor Lattin, 10 the loss to the shareholders here was no
greater than in any other case of mismanagement. If the directors
were guilty of mismanagement, the corporation would have a
cause of action against them.
The result reached in the present case is highly desirable and
allows the beneficial purpose of the appraisal provisions11 to continue without the delay and expense which would result from requiring that notice be given to each of the numerous individual
shareholders. The only criticism of the Supreme Court's decision
is that it did not rest upon the simple proposition that the demand
made by a dissenting shareholder is made upon the corporation,
and that in receiving notice and acting thereon the corporation
acts through its normal management, the directors.
M.M.H.

FEDERAL PROCEDURE-DECISIONS

OF INFERIOR STATE COURTS-

BINDING ON FEDERAL COURTS-Suit was brought to compel defendant company to restore the rights of plaintiffs as remaindermen
in certain shares of stock in defendant company. Whether the
statute of limitations barred the action was dependant upon
whether a demand upon defendant was a prerequisite to the accrual of the cause of action. The only state decision on this subject in the district where the case was brought was by an intermediate appellate court of Ohio. The circuit court of appeals declined to follow this decision. Held, on writs of certiorari, that the
decision of the Ohio appellate court was "state law," and must be
9. Under the statute the corporation could reject the offer and make a
counter offer, and If it was refused, could file a petition asking the court for
an appraisement; or the corporation could abandon the sale. Ohio Gen. Code
Ann. (Page, 1938) § 8623-72, par. 106. Cf. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 52, I [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 1132, I] which has substantially the same provisions.
10. Lattin, supra note 7.
11. For discussion of the right of appraisal generally, see Bennett, Remodeling, Merger, and Dissolution of Louisiana Corporations-A Critical
Survey (1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 481, 482 et seq.; Lattin, Remedies under Appraisal Statutes (1931) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 233; Lattin, supra note 7, at
1177.
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NOTES

followed by the Federal court. West v. American Telephone and
Telegraph Company, 61 S.Ct. 179 (1940).
Prior to the decision of Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,1
there existed a conflict in the lower federal courts as to whether
decisions of intermediate state courts interpreting state statutes
were binding on the federal courts sitting in that state. Probably
the majority view was that such decisions, although persuasive,
were not binding on the federal courts.2 Other courts held that
where the highest state court had not spoken, the decisions of the
intermediate state courts should be followed.'
After the Erie case, the conflict of authority persisted both
with respect to decisions interpreting state statutes and also decisions declaring the state's common law. But the majority rule
was that such decisions must be followed. 4 The tendency of the
federal courts was to follow whatever indications there were of
local law in order to ascertain conscientiously what the state
court of last resort would declare the local law to be.
West v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, which
was followed in two other decisions by the United States Supreme Court within twenty-four hours, 6 has now settled the problem. Chief Justice Hughes, in Fidelity Union Trust Company v.
Field7 said, that the "highest state court is the final authority on
state law ... but it is still the duty of the federal courts, where
the state law supplies the rule of decision, to ascertain and apply
that law even though it has not been expounded by the highest
court of the State .... An intermediate state court in declaring
and applying the state law is acting as an organ of the State and
1. 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
2. Patapsco Guano Co. v. Morrison, 18 Fed. Cas. No. 10792 (S.D.Ga. 1886);
Freund v. Yaegerman, 27 Fed. 248 (E.D.Mo. 1886); Anglo-American Land,
M. & A. Co. v. Lombard, 132 Fed. 721 (C.C.A. 8th, 1904); United States Telephone Co. v. Central Union Telephone Co., 202 Fed. 66 (C.C.A. 6th, 1913), cert.
denied, 229 U.S. 620, 22 S.Ct. 1049, 57 L.Ed. 1354 (1913); In re Gary, 281 Fed. 218
(S.D. Tex. 1922); Irving Nat. Bank v. Law, 9 F. (2d) 536 (C.C.A. 2d, 1925).
3. Eaton v. St. Louis Shakspear Mining & Smelting Co., 7 Fed. 139 (E.D.
Mo. 1881); Hay v. Alexandria & W. R.R., 20 Fed. 15 (E.D. Va. 1884).
4. Hack v. American Surety Co., 96 F. (2d) 939 (C.C.A. 7th, 1938); In re
Wiegand, 27 F. Supp. 725 (S.D. Cal. 1939); In re Shyvers, 33 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.
Cal. 1940).
But for a holding that the decisions of intermediate state courts were
not binding on federal courts, see Kehaya v. Axton, 32 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. N.Y.
1940).
5. 61 S.Ct. 179 (1940).
6. 61 S.Ct. 176 (1940); Six Companies of California v. Joint Highway Dist.
No. 13, 61 S.Ct. 186 (1940).
7. 61 S.Ct. 176 (1940).
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its determination, in the absence of more convincing evidence of
what the state law is, should be followed by the federal court."8
These decisions further advance the fundamental purpose of
the Erie decision. They represent another step in the removal of
judicial uncertainties attendant upon a duplex system of jurisprudence. The whole purpose of the Erie decision might be
thwarted if federal courts were free to choose their own rules of
decision whenever the highest court of the state has not spoken,
since the state is not necessarily without law on a subject merely
because its highest courts have not spoken. The federal courts
must now follow the rules of intermediate appellate courts of the
state, unless "convinced by other persuasive data that the highest
court of the state would decide otherwise. '
G.D.L.

LABOR LAw-NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT-APPLICATION TO ANTITRUST PROSECUTION OF LABOR UNIONs-Members of

two craft

unions, both affiliated with the American Federation of Labor,
disagreed over which was to perform certain work for their mutual employer, a brewing company dependent on interstate commerce for materials and a market. The dispute resulted in a strike,
picketing, and boycott whereby one union sought to force its
jurisdictional demands on the employer. Officials of the dissatisfied organization were indicted under the Sherman Act for combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade. Held, demurrers
denying that what was charged constituted a violation of the laws
of the United States were properly sustained. United States v.
Hutcheson, 61 S.Ct. 463, 85 L.Ed. 422 (1941).
The conclusion at which the Court arrived is another significant extension of the concept that labor should be relatively free
from legal restraint.' But the process of statutory interpretation
relied upon to sustain this result presents an interesting problem.
The Court's line of reasoning can be restated substantially as
8. 61 S.Ct. at 178.

9. West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 61 S.Ct. 179, 183 (1940).
1. Compare Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093

(1940) (involving the right to picket); Apex Hosiery Mills v. Leader, 310 U.S.
469, 60 S.Ct. 982, 84 L.Ed. 1311 (1940) (dealing with a suit for triple damages
under the Sherman Act); American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 61 S.Ct.
568, 85 L.Ed. 513 (1941) (concerning the right to picket). Cf. Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 61 S.Ct. 552, 85 L.Ed. 497 (1941).

